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Abstract
In this paper, the structural vector autoregressive (SVAR) model is used to analyze
short-run and contemporaneous relationships between monetary aggregates and other
macroeconomic variables. This requires imposing restrictions on the correlation struc-
ture of the VAR residuals. Different approaches can be followed to serve this task. One
approach is to use the Cholesky decomposition together with the assumption of a re-
cursive structure of the contemporaneous relationships between the variables. Another
approach uses the information given by the history of the variables (generalized im-
pulse response functions). A third possibility is to adopt restrictions from economic
theory.
The purpose of this paper is to investigate the implications of the latter technique
in a simple monetary framework for both Germany and the Euro area. VAR/VECM
residuals are interpreted as deviations of the variables from their conditional expected
values, which are also analyzed in a broad set of theoretical monetary models. The
model used here builds upon the framework proposed by McCallum (1989) with an
extension in order to consider the role of private banks in the money supply process.
The implications of this model for impulse response analysis are discussed, and im-
pulse responses for different models are calculated and compared to each other.
Keywords: Impulse response analysis, IS-LM-AS model, monetary policy, structural
vector autoregressive (SVAR) models.
JEL classification: C32, E52.
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1 Introduction
Until 1998, monetary policy in Germany was conducted by the Deutsche Bundesbank. The main
objective of the Bundesbank, which was given by  3 Bundesbankgesetz, was to guarantee a stable
currency and a well functioning monetary system (circulation of money, supply of credit). To make
this task, the Bundesbank adopted the conception of controlling a monetary aggregate in 1975.
The theoretical foundations of this conception are formed by the quantity theory of money and the
assumption of a stable money demand function. Since stage three of the Economic and Monetary
Union (EMU) has started in January 1999, the European System of Central Banks (ESCB) is in
charge of the single monetary policy in the euro area.1 The primary objective of the ESCB is price
stability (defined in Article 105 of the Treaty establishing the European Community2), and the
ESCB has adopted a two pillar strategy to achieve its objective. These two pillars are ”a prominent
role for money, as signalled by the announcement of a reference value for the growth of a broad
monetary aggregate; and a broadly based assessment of the outlook for future price developments
and the risks to price stability in the euro area as a whole.” (ECB, 1999b, p. 46) It is important
to notice that the reference value for the growth rate of a monetary aggregate is not a monetary
target. It ”acts as an analytical and presentational tool which constitutes an important benchmark
for assessing risks to price stability.” (ECB, 2000, p. 41)
The purpose of this paper is to compare the role of monetary aggregates in the monetary policy
conception of the Bundesbank and in the monetary policy strategy of the ESCB and to investi-
gate their implications for the empirical analysis of monetary policy effects. The development
of a framework for monetary policy analysis incorporates a trade-off between the consideration
of theoretic models in modern monetary economics and the empirical applicability. Realistic and
sophisticated models for monetary economies have often no unique time series implications that
can be used in the empirical analysis of monetary policy. Therefore, it is tried to find a framework
that is on the one hand compatible with the implications of standard theoretical models, and, on
the other hand is simple enough to allow for an empirical implementation. Expressed in the words
of McCallum (1989, p. 201), such a model should be “(i) reasonably simple to work with, (ii)
generally compatible with the basic principles of economic theory, (iii) adequately consistent with
essential empirical regularities concerning macroeconomic fluctuations in actual economies.”
The plan for the paper is as follows. First, in section 2, the monetary policy strategies of the
Bundesbank and the ESCB are compared. Then, in section 3, a model of a monetary economy in
which the money stock is determined by the interactions of the central bank, private banks, and
the public is presented. In section 4, the econometric methodology is explained. The empirical
implementation and results are discussed in section 5, and section 6 concludes.
2 Monetary Policy in Germany and in the Euro Area
2.1 Price Stability as Objective of Monetary Policy
Both institutions, the Bundesbank and the ESCB, are in charge of maintaining price stability.3 As
mentioned above, the objective of price stability is given by law. However, the Bundesbank and the
1 Stage three started with eleven participating countries (EU-11: Belgium, Germany, Spain, France, Ireland, Italy,
Luxembourg, the Netherlands, Austria, Portugal, and Finland), Greece entered the third stage of EMU on 1 January
2001 (EU-12).
2 The treaty is available via internet, for example under http://europa.eu.int.
3 If the Bundesbank and its monetary policy is referred to in this paper it is always meant the monetary policy of the
Bundesbank until 1998.
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ESCB can decide how to define and how to achieve price stability. The arguments for price stability
as the objective of the central bank are reviewed for example in Bofinger et al. (1996) and in Issing
(2000). First, it is well known that inflation reduces welfare. If the rate of inflation is correctly
anticipated, the welfare costs of inflation originate from suboptimal money holdings (shoe leather
costs), from the necessity of price adjustments (menu costs), and from distortional effects of the
tax system. If the rate of inflation is not correctly anticipated, further costs of inflation occur.
Wages and nominal interest rates are not correctly adjusted such that the allocation efficiency is
harmed, and the income and wealth distributions are affected. Second, no convincing or at least
no unambiguous arguments in favor of a positive inflation rate exist. For example, the positive
effect of inflation on growth due to a substitution effect from money holdings to holdings of real
capital proposed by Tobin can neither be shown analytically nor empirically. High and variable
inflation rates are included in long-term interest rates together with a risk premium and increase
therefore investment costs. In models that follow Sidrauski (money-in-the-utility-function models)
and in cash-in-advance models, output does not depend on the rate of inflation.4 In these models
money is superneutral, that is, the growth rate of money does not affect the real equilibrium.5
If price and/or wage rigidities are added to these models it is typically found that real output is
affected by unanticipated inflation but not by anticipated inflation. Therefore, monetary policy
cannot systematically increase or stabilize real output.
Taking together these two lines of arguments, that inflation reduces welfare and that inflation does
not systematically affect real output, gives a theoretical foundation for the choice of price stability
as an objective of monetary policy. Combining these arguments with the conceptual work of
Tinbergen6 about policy objectives and instruments leads to the choice of price stability as the
single or primary objective of monetary policy.
The objective of price stability can be defined in two ways: either as a price level or as an inflation
target. If the price level is targeted, deviations must be compensated in subsequent periods. This
adds policy induced fluctuations in inflation and output to the economy but stabilizes the long-run
expectations of the price level. In practice, price stability is defined as follows: until 1984 the
Bundesbank has assumed an unavoidable inflation based on the conviction that inflation has to be
reduced slowly in order to avoid increasing unemployment. From 1984 on, a “normative” increase
in the cost of living index of 2% per annum has been interpreted as in line with price stability. The
ECB defines price stability as a year-to-year increase in the harmonized index of consumer prices
of below 2%.
2.2 Implementation of Monetary Policy in Germany
The monetary policy conception of the Bundesbank has been based on a two-stage approach.7
Because the time lags between the occurrence of a monetary policy impulse and the observation
of reactions of the relevant macroeconomic variables, especially prices, are long and variable,
the Bundesbank has controlled an intermediate target since 1975.8 The intermediate target has
4 Both money-in-the-utility-function models and cash-in-advance models are extensions of Walrasian general equi-
librium models with completely flexible prices. They are broadly discussed for example in Walsh (1998).
5 Superneutrality of money is for example defined in this way in Blanchard and Fischer (1989, Chapter 4).
6 Following Tinbergen, policymakers can achieve the desired levels of targets if the number of independent instru-
ments is not lower than the number of targets. For a brief and illuminating overview see Sachs and Larrain (1993,
Ch. 19).
7 This section follows mainly Deutsche Bundesbank (1995). A description of the conduct of monetary policy in
Germany is also given in Brand (2001).
8 See for example Friedman (1990) or Walsh (1998) for the theoretical foundations of choosing an intermediate
target.
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been central bank money (a virtual money stock variable consisting of currency in circulation and
required reserves at constant required reserve rates of 1974) until 1987 and M3 (currency in circu-
lation, sight deposits, time deposits and savings deposits9) from 1988 to 1998. According to the
Bundesbank, M3 has been chosen as intermediate target because it exhibits a stable relation to the
future price level (leading indicator property of money for prices) and is sufficiently controllable.
While the leading indicator property is widely accepted in the literature it is sometimes questioned
if the Bundesbank has been able to control M3. The target has been met in thirteen of twenty-four
years of monetary targeting in Germany, see Holtemo¨ller (2001a). The desired growth rate of M3
has been derived from the quantity equation that equates money stock times velocity of circulation
and real output times price level. Given the normative price level growth described in the previous
section, the desired money growth rate has been calculated by inserting forecasts of real potential
output growth and changes in velocity. The use of potential output (and not expected real output)
has been founded upon the medium-term and stability oriented nature of monetary targeting.
How has the Bundesbank controlled the money stock? The Bundesbank itself has described the
control process as quantity setting (Deutsche Bundesbank, 1995, p. 94) using its monopoly on issu-
ing currency and required reserve policy. Assuming a more or less stable relationship between the
monetary base and the money stock, the Bundesbank has calculated at the beginning of each month
the quantity of base money that is compatible with the monetary target. Further, the Bundesbank
conducted monthly forecasts of the demand for base money of private banks. The gap between
normative and actual demand for base money has then tried to be closed by influencing the money
market conditions by means of interest rates (Lombard rate, discount rate, and an interest rate for
open market operations) and so-called compensating or fine-tuning instruments (foreign exchange
swaps, quick tenders and others). This type of monetary policy can be called reserve-oriented:
the reserves needed by the banking system to fulfill the reserve requirement are controlled – not
completely but to a considerable extent – by the Bundesbank.
2.3 Implementation of Monetary Policy in the Euro Area
Since January 1999 the single monetary policy in the euro area is conducted by the ESCB. In
order to achieve its given primary objective of price stability, the ESCB has developed a stability-
oriented monetary policy strategy that consists of a quantitative definition of price stability, and
a two-pillar strategy used to achieve price stability.10 The first pillar assigns a prominent role
to money. A reference value for the growth of M3 is calculated (in a similar way to that one
described in the previous section) and published. Within the second pillar the non-monetary risks
for price stability are analyzed. These are for example the conditions and developments on goods
and labor markets. The ESCB stresses that both pillars are not targets themselves. The only
target or objective is price stability. Both the analysis of the growth of money stock and the
evaluation of other risks to price stability are informational tools helping the governing council of
the ECB to reach decisions on monetary policy actions. To the best of my knowledge, a document
describing how the information is weighted is not available. Therefore, it is not clear how the
ECB translates the information into monetary policy actions, and it is difficult to explain what
guides the ECB in using its operational instruments. It can only be said which set of instruments
9 Time deposits and savings deposits are only included if they satisfy certain requirements, see Deutsche Bundesbank
(1995).
10 The main references for this section are European Central Bank (1999b) and European Central Bank (2000). Fur-
ther information can be found in a recent book by Issing et al. (2001) and on the internet homepage of the European
Central Bank: www.ecb.int.
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the ECB uses to manage liquidity and steer interest rates.11 This set consists of open market
operations, standing facilities, and the minimum reserve requirement. Open market operations
can be divided into four groups: main refinancing operations (weekly frequency, maturity of two
weeks), longer-term refinancing operations (monthly frequency, maturity of three months), fine-
tuning operations (reverse transactions, outright transactions, foreign exchange swaps, collection
of fixed-term deposits), and structural operations. Standard facilities (marginal lending facility and
deposit facility) can be used by credit institutions that are obliged to hold required reserves, and
the minimum reserve requirement creates the necessity of central bank lending; in opposition to
the practice in Germany until 1998, the Eurosystem pays interest on required reserves.
2.4 Comparison of Bundesbank Conception and ESCB Strategy
It has become clear from the previous sections that the monetary policy conception of the Bun-
desbank and the stability-oriented monetary policy strategy of the Eurosystem are quite different.
The Bundesbank has used a theoretically well founded two-stage approach by first determining
the value of the intermediate target (growth rate of money) that is compatible with the final objec-
tive (price stability), and subsequently taking actions to achieve this specific value (or range) of
the intermediate target. It should be noticed that it has been questioned whether the Bundesbank
really pursued a policy of monetary targeting or whether it has only used monetary targeting as a
communication strategy.12 However, the Bundesbank has always made clear that it has been ac-
countable for deviations from the monetary target and that deviations are only accepted if there are
important economic reasons for a deviation. Issing (1997, p. 71), who was member of the board
of the Bundesbank from 1990-1998, even states that deviations from the target have been mainly
“deliberate monetary policy decisions”.
The Eurosystem does not make use of the two-stage approach. It puts the focus directly on its
ultimate objective price stability and uses the development of the money stock as one piece of
information in its decision process, and the single monetary policy cannot be characterized as a
policy of controlling the quantity of a monetary aggregate. Instead, the Eurosystem controls the
conditions on the money market, especially the main refinancing operations minimum bid rate
which is intensively observed by the public.
3 A Theoretical Framework for the Analysis of Monetary Policy
3.1 A Basic Model of the Economy
A model type that is widely used in the applied macroeconomic literature is the IS-LM-AS frame-
work. It consists in general of three equations: an aggregate demand function, a money demand
function and an aggregate supply function. This model has been criticized intensively, especially
11 The operational framework of the Eurosystem is described in European Central Bank (1998) and European Central
Bank (1999a).
12 Two examples are Mishkin (1999, p. 588): “Monetary targeting in Germany and Switzerland should instead be seen
primarily as a method of communicating the strategy of monetary policy that focuses on long-run considerations
and the control of inflation.”, and Svensson (2000, p. 2): the “Bundesbank has actually been an inflation targeter in
deeds and a monetary targeter in words only.” See also the literature cited there. It has also been supposed in the
literature that the Bundesbank followed a Taylor (1993)-type interest rate rule in order to control inflation, see for
example Clarida and Gertler (1996) and Bru¨ggemann (2001). Von Hagen (1999) stresses that a monetary policy
strategy is more important for the clarification of the role of monetary policy within the economy than for guiding
actual monetary policy decisions.
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from the proponents of real business cycle theory. As Romer (1996) points out, the main dis-
advantages of the IS-LM-AS framework as an outcome of traditional Keynesian theories of the
business cycle are consequences of building the model on assumptions about the relations of ag-
gregated variables instead of deriving them from microeconomic principles. Without specifying
preferences, nothing can be said about welfare effects, important effects can be overseen, and the
Lucas critique applies. The advantages of the IS-LM-AS approach are its simplicity, and its robust-
ness. Additionally, its is argued by Walsh (1998, p. 204 ff) that the IS-LM-AS is not “starting from
curves” because it can be interpreted as a special case of a modified money-in-the-utility-function
model that is based on first principles. The three necessary modifications are (1) the assumption
of a constant capital stock, (2) the assumption of an inelastic labor supply, and (3) the assumption
of one-period nominal wage contracts. These assumptions are restrictive but seem plausible if the
main interest of the analysis is investigating short-run dynamics. Therefore, the IS-LM-AS frame-
work satisfies McCallum’s criteria (i) and (ii) mentioned earlier. Criterion (iii) – the empirical
quality – is analyzed in section 5.
The exact specification of the three model equations is not unique, and different specifications
have been used for different purposes. The specification used here follows McCallum (1981).
Basic hypotheses underlying the IS-LM-AS model are (Modigliani and Papademos, 1990): (1) the
money stock under consideration is a narrow one that is used mainly for transaction purposes, (2)
the monetary authority can control the money stock up to a random component, (3) non-monetary
assets (financial and real) are assumed to be close substitutes, (4) wealth and capital accumulation
have no impact on the supply and demand of goods and financial assets, and (5) government and
fiscal effects are ignored.
The IS equation describing the output-interest combinations for which the planned and actual
expenditures on output are equal is
	
fffiffifl! "#$fl&%'%)(*,+ (3.1)
where  and fl are logarithms of real output and price level,  is the nominal interest rate, .-0/ ,
and 1fffi denotes the expected value given the information set of 2 	3 . The specification of the
information set is important, see footnote 13. The real interest rate 45fffiffifl6! "$fl6&% has a
negative impact on planned expenditures because it negatively affects planned consumption and
investment. The LM relation describes output-interest combinations for which money supply and
money demand are equal at a given price level. It is specified as
789fl6;:
<:=>?6:@AB6DC,+ (3.2)
where 78 is logarithmic money stock, :EF-G/ , and :@IH0/ . The negative impact of the interest rate
on money demand expresses the opportunity costs of holding money, and the positive sign of :@
is explained by the transaction motive of money holdings. The AS relation can be interpreted as
an expectations augmented Phillips curve or as a Lucas supply curve stating that actual output is
increasing if inflation is higher than expected or if positive supply shocks occur:
BJK
DJ6Lfl6")1fffiffifl6! "A%DJK@MfffiNDOP,+ (3.3)
where JfiFHG/ , and /Q-JK@R-S3 . The disturbance terms (*T+ACB , and OP are shocks that are independent
of past values of all variables. They are interpreted as aggregate demand shock, monetary shock,
and aggregate supply shock, respectively.
The model can be closed by specifying a monetary policy rule. This rule or reaction function links
the (intermediate) target variable of the monetary authority to the state of the economy. The choice
of this target variable is discussed in section 3.3. Now, the model can be solved, and reduced form
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expressions for the endogenous variables fl+A"+''+A7 can be calculated, for example by using the
undetermined coefficients procedure, see McCallum (1981) and McCallum (1989).
The main implication of this type of model is long-run neutrality of money.13 Monetary policy can
affect the real equilibrium only in the short-run by surprising the private agents such that the actual
inflation rate deviates from the expected inflation rate.
3.2 Money Creation and Financial Structure
In the traditional IS-LM-AS model it is assumed that the money stock is set exogenously by the
monetary authority. As discussed in Holtemo¨ller (2001a), this assumption is not a priori reasonable
for developed monetary economies like Germany or the Euro area where not narrow money but a
broad monetary aggregate (M3) is usually considered in monetary policy analysis. Therefore, it
is now discussed how the model of the previous section has to be modified in order to consider a
more realistic money supply process.
The money multiplier approach makes clear that three different groups of agents participate in the
money supply process. These are private households and firms, private banks, and the central bank.
In this section, the role of private banks in the money supply process is discussed.14 This makes
assumptions about the behavior of banks necessary. The framework of the following analysis
is the industrial organization approach to banking theory like it is also used in Vanhoose (1985)
and in Holtemo¨ller (2001a).15 Banks are treated as profit-maximizing firms that accept deposits
and originate loans. Additionally, banks buy and sell government securities, such that the profit
function of a private bank U is:
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where  [ +A ] +A ` are interest rates on loans ( \ ), securities ( ^ ), and deposits ( a ), respectively, and
Z
W
 are excess reserves with revenue function XYZ W % . This profit function is maximized subject to
the balance sheet restriction
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where j is the required reserve rate, and banks hold required reserves j a W as well as excess re-
serves Z
W

. Of course, the operating cost function bY>l!% has to satisfy usual regularity assumptions
to guarantee the existence and uniqueness of a profit maximum. The market structure is assumed
to be as follows: banks are Cournot-oligopolists on the markets for loans and deposits. They select
the quantities of loans and deposits, and the respective interest rates are determined by inverse
loan demand and deposit demand functions of the public. Following Vanhoose (1985) the inverse
demand function for deposits by the public is defined as
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where mE| are constants. The market for securities is competitive. The Lagrangian of the maximiza-
tion problem is }
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13 If expectations in equation (3.1) are described by NLx instead of ffŁKBLx , output depends on the systematic
part of monetary policy, and money is not neutral in the long run, see McCallum (1989, chapter 11.2).
14 For an overview of this topic see for example Modigliani and Papademos (1990).
15 This approach is based on the work of Klein (1971) and Monti (1972). An overview can be found in Freixas and
Rochet (1997).
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and the first order conditions are
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From this expression, the interest rate paid on deposits can be derived by summing over all banks:
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Assuming constant marginal operating costs for deposits and securities, a constant number of banks
g
, and a constant inverse deposit demand elasticity makes (3.14) a reduced form expression for
the interest rate on deposits. The total quantity of deposits can be calculated by inserting (3.14)
into the inverse deposit demand function (3.6) and solving for a  :
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Now, the total quantity of reserves   (required and excess) is
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and from (3.8) and (3.10) it can be seen that Z W is a function of  ] . Therefore, a log-linear
approximation of the quantity of deposits is
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where
 
 and ¢ are the logarithms of a  and   .
The financial structure developed in this section can now be added to the basic model of the pre-
vious section. The model of the economy consists now of the IS relationship16 (3.1), the AS
relationship (3.3), the modified LM relationship
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the interest rate equation (3.14), and the deposits-reserve relation (3.18). The opportunity costs of
holding money are now measured by the interest rate spread, and it is assumed that the quantity of
money equals the quantity of deposits ( 78N    ). That is, currency in circulation is ignored in this
model. Like the basic model of section 3.1, the model is completed with a monetary policy rule,
and can then be solved for the endogenous variables  ` +A ] +'78T+pfl6,+A , and ¢ . The choice of the
monetary policy rule is discussed in the next section.
16 In opposition to the basic version of the model, there are now two interest rates: £ffi¤

and £¥

. It is supposed in the
following that the relevant interest rate in the IS relation is £ffi¤

.
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3.3 Money Stock and Interest Rate as Monetary Policy Instruments
In section 2.2, the monetary policy of the Bundesbank is described as reserve-oriented. This type
of policy is characterized by
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First, the desired level of the money stock 7 ¦ is determined, and subsequently, the corresponding
quantity of reserves to be implemented is calculated from (3.20). This is done one period before
the implementation such that the interest rate on securities in period 2 has to be replaced by its
expectation. Equation (3.20) is a monetary policy rule closing the model.
The monetary policy of the ECB cannot be described by such a reserve-oriented rule but may
be described by an interest rate rule. Though the ECB does not intend to control a monetary
aggregate it is assumed as a first approximation that the desired interest rate level is chosen such
that the expected money stock is equal to the money stock 7 ¦ that is compatible with the reference
value for money growth. This interest rate level can be calculated by inserting (3.14) into (3.19)
and solving for  ] :
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A possible modification of this interest rate rule is to calculate the desired interest rate such that a
certain price level is expected. Additionally, it would be more realistic to assume that the ECB tries
to steer the money market interest rate  ` and not the interest rate on securities  ] . Additionally, in
section 4.3 it will become clear that the model is not well specified with the monetary policy rule
(3.21). In order to consider these problems, assume that the interest rate set by the central bank
is a function of the money stock and the price level. Such a rule can be interpreted as a stylized
“two pillar” monetary policy rule and is used in the empirical application. The exact specification
is given in section 4.3.
4 Structural Vector Autoregressive Models as Tool for Monetary
Policy Analysis
4.1 Statistical Analysis of Structural Vector Autoregressive Models
The empirical analysis of the impact of monetary policy on macroeconomic variables is conducted
by using vector autoregressive models. This is a tool that is widely used for this purpose. In its
basic form, a vector autoregressive model of order ³ is described by17
´fiµ6 ¶
z
|
{
#·
|¸´fiffK|6D¹fi,+ (4.1)
where ´fiº»ffi´ffiT+´¼@&T+=f=f=f*+'´K½M&%&¾ is a LflÀ¿03B% vector of endogenous variables, ¹¼RÁg?/x+ÂÃe% is a
fl
-dimensional n.i.d. error process with mean vector 0 and covariance matrix ÂÃ , µ" contains de-
terministic terms (which are ignored in the following) like a constant, a linear time trend and/or
17 The econometric analysis of VAR models is discussed for example in Lu¨tkepohl (1993), Lu¨tkepohl (2001), and
Hamilton (1994).
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dummy variables. The coefficient matrices
·
| and the covariance matrix ÂÃ can be estimated using
the ordinary least squares technique, and the optimal lag length ³ can be determined by compar-
ing information criteria like Akaike Information Criterion (AIC), Hannan-Quinn Criterion (HQ)
or Schwarz Criterion (SC). Once the parameters of the model have been estimated, the structural
information of the model can be summarized in different ways. One possibility is the inspection
of the implied impulse response functions measuring the impact of single innovations on the en-
dogenous variables. Forecast error impulse responses Ä | are calculated from the moving average
representation of the VAR:18
´fiN Å
z
|
{


Ä
|¸¹¼ffK|&f (4.2)
The underlying assumption that innovations in the different equations are uncorrelated (that ÂÃ
is diagonal) is in general not compatible with the observed data and with the theoretical back-
ground. The contemporaneous relationships between the variables can be included into the model
by transforming the VAR model (4.1) into the structural vector autoregressive (SVAR) model:19
·

´fiN ¶
z
|
{
 ·
¦
|
´fiffK|6
·

A¹fiT+ (4.3)
where
·
¦
|

·


·
|
,
.Æ3e+f=f=fP+
³ . A usual way of identifying the instantaneous relationships is to
assume a recursive causal structure. That is, the first variable ´ffi is only influenced by innovations
in the first equation and lagged variables; the second variable is affected by innovations in the
first equation, by innovations in the second equation, and lagged variables, and so on. In this
case,
·

QÈÇ
fi
, and ÂÃ$ÈÇÉÇÊ¾ , where Ç is a triangular matrix calculated using the Cholesky
decomposition. Of course, the implications of the model do now depend on the ordering of the
variables in ´fi . A more general model nesting the recursive structure is the following one. Equation
(4.1) can also be written as
·

\
%&´fiË¹¼&+
·

\
%o	Ì½w
·

\
Gf=f=fe
·
¶
\
¶
+ (4.4)
where \ denotes the Lag operator \
|
´fiÈ´fiffK|
, and Ì>½ is a fl -dimensional identity matrix. The
structure is now imposed by multiplying (4.4) with
·

·

 and assuming that
·
¹¼FÍÎ such
that
·I·

\
%&´fiN
·
¹fi,+
·
¹fiÍÎT+ ÎÁSg?/x+MÌ½Ï%Af (4.5)
This model type is called AB-model by Amisano and Giannini (1997). These authors also provide
the following estimation technique. The parameters of the model are estimated in two steps: first,
the reduced form (4.4) is estimated in the usual way by OLS; second the Ð fl
@
coefficients in
·
and Í are determined by imposing at least flflÉG3%>Ñ Ð (non-linear) restrictions, and estimating the
remaining (at most Ð fl
@
Êflfl4$3B%TÑ
Ð ) free elements by maximization of the log-likelihood function,
which is
}

·
+MÍQ%Ò :oÔÓ
ÐÖÕ!×eØ
n*Ù
·
Ù
@
q
SÓ
Ð8Õ!×eØ
n*Ù
Í
Ù
@
q
SÓ
Ð
tr Ú
·
¾
Í
¾
fi
Í
fi
·ÜÛ
ÂÃÝ
 :oÔÓ
ÐÖÕ!×eØ
n*ÙªÞÙ
@
q
SÓ
Ð
tr Ú Þ ¾ Þ
Û
ÂÃÝß+ (4.6)
where
Ó
is the sample size, Þ àÍ
fi
·
,
:º5
Ó
fláÑ
Ð
%
Õ!â

Ðuã
% and
Û
ÂÃ is a consistent estimator of
ÂÃ
. The restrictions that have to be imposed to achieve local identification can be summarized as
18 Such a representation exists if the process is stationary. The case of non-stationarity is ignored for the present but
is discussed later.
19 SVAR models are discussed for example in Amisano and Giannini (1997), Breitung (2000), and Hamilton (1994).
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follows: äRå
vec
·

 
å
äIæ
vec Í 
 
æ ç
or è
äIå
/
/
äRæé
è
vec
·
vec Í
é

è
 
å
 
æé
+ (4.7)
where vec is an operator that stacks the columns of a matrix into a single column vector,
ä
¯
are
( j
¯
¿Nfl
@
) full row rank matrices,  
¯
are ( j
¯
¿R3 ) vectors, and j
å
and j
æ
denote the number of restrictions
on
·
and Í , respectively. The restrictions can also be parameterized as
vec
·

^
åPêKå
ë
å
vec Í  ^
æ,êKæ
ë
æ ç
or è
vec
·
vec Í
é

è
^
å
/
/
^
æ é
è
êKå
êKæ é

è
ë
å
ë
æ é
+ (4.8)
where ^
¯
are (fl
@
¿íì
¯
) full column rank matrices, ë
¯
are (fl
@
¿03 ) vectors, and ì
å
ifl
@
Gj
å
and
ì
æ
Dfl
@
j
æ
are the numbers of freely estimated coefficients of
·
and Í , respectively.
The log-likelihood function has to be maximized using a numerical iterative procedure, see Ap-
pendix B.
4.2 Impulse Response Functions of SVARs
Following Amisano and Giannini (1997), impulse responses for structural VARs can be calculated
by î

. Þ
fi
d?Í
fi
·
%
fi

·
fi
ÍY+
î
|ðïNñ
|
ï
¾
î

=+ <d3e+
Ð
+f=f=f (4.9)
where
ñ  òó
ó
ó
óô
·

·
@ lElEl
·
¶
fi
·
¶
Ì½ / lElEl / /
/ Ì>½ lElEl / /
lElEl lElElõlElEl lElEl lElEl
/ / lElEl Ì½ /
ö÷
÷
÷
÷
ø
+ ï9d©ùÌ>½ / lElEl /
«
+
ñ is a Lfl ³ ¿Yfl ³ % matrix, and ï is a flh¿Yfl ³ % matrix, or by
î
|
Ä
|ál
î

+
Ä

.	Ì½e+
Ä
|
|
z ú
{

Ä
|°
ú
·
ú
+ ð3e+
Ð
+f=f=fP+ (4.10)
where
·
|./ for H ³ . The impulse responses are estimated by replacing the theoretical vari-
ables with the respective estimators. In the following, the same notation for theoretical impulse re-
sponses and estimated impulse responses is used. The estimated impulse responses that are stored
up to horizon  in vec ©
î

=+
î
+=ff=f+
îÊû
« are unbiased and asymptotically normally independently
distributed with covariance matrix

ü
Â.ý4

%
. Some preliminary calculations are necessary to com-
pute Â.ý#  % :
Â.þß!Ì>½ Í
fi
Ù
Ü
·
¾
Í
¾
fi
% 0Í
fi
Â
å>æ
è
Ì½ Í
¾
fi
)Í
fi
·
% Í
¾
fi
é
(4.11)
Â.ý4/ %SÂ
þ

n
Þ
¾
fi
 
Þ
fi
q
Â.þ)n
Þ
fi
 
Þ
¾
fi
q (4.12)
The matrix Â.ý4  % consists of   )3B%P  D3B% blocks of dimension fl
@
¿Éfl
@
, denoted by Â.ýo  %&|
ú
,
o;/x+=f=f=f*+
 , 	
S/+f=f=f+
 . The covariance matrix of vec
î
| is given by the block Â.ýo  %&| | . The
blocks are defined as
Â.ýo

%p|
ú
X|Â
vec 
 
 

X
¾
ú

ß
Ì>½ Ô,ïNñ
|
ï
¾
%

Â.ýo/ %
ß
Ì½ STïñ
|
ï
¾
%

¾
+ (4.13)
'+
	
d3e+=f=ff*+
 , where
X
F;/+ X|
|°fi
z
W={


n
ß
î
¾


ï4?ñ
¾
%
|°fi,
W

 Ô©ïñ
W
ï
¾
«
q
+ 4HG/xf (4.14)
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4.3 Combining the Economic Model and SVAR Theory
The economic model discussed above and the SVAR methodology can be combined in the fol-
lowing way. First, the case of a reserve-oriented monetary policy is considered. If the model
equations are used to calculate the deviations of the actual realizations from their expected values,
the solution of the model is given by the system20
òó
óô
I 3 R /
RJ6 3 / /
É3 R:@ R:E©3wT31_jK%
«
 3
/ / º¡e 3
ö÷
÷
ø
  

òó
óô
Û
fl6
Û
B
Û

]

Û
78
ö÷
÷
ø

òó
óô
ÎBffi
Î=@&
Î=v&
Î,
ö÷
÷
ø
+ (4.15)
where a hat above the endogenous variables symbolizes the expectation error
Û
´fi#;´fi1fffi© ´fi
«
,
and
Û
78. 787
¦

. The error terms Î|  can now be interpreted as structural shocks: ÎBffi and Î=@&
are real shocks, Î=v& is a money demand shock (MD) and Î, is a money supply shock (MS). In the
empirical application (section 5) it is assumed that :E©3wG>3_jK% «  is constant. This is clearly not
the case, especially for the required reserve rate j . However, the analysis in Holtemo¨ller (2001a)
has shown that the impact of the required reserve rate is only important if the relation between the
monetary base and the money stock is considered. The monetary base is part of the theoretical
model used here, but is not part of the reduced form (4.15). This justifies to some extent the
constancy assumption.
In case of an interest rate rule, the solution is given by the system
ò
ô
I 3 /
RJ6 3 /
3 R:@ 3
ö
ø
  

ò
ô
Û
fl6
Û
B
Û
78
ö
ø

ò
ô
ÎBffi
Î=@&
Î=v&
ö
ø
f (4.16)
By assuming that the expected values of the endogenous variables, fffi© ´fi « can be calculated from
a VAR representation, the VAR residuals ¹fi can be interpreted as deviations of the variables from
the respective expected values:
¹fi
Û
´fi´fi")fffi© ´fi
«
f (4.17)
The SVAR framework provides the econometric methodology to model the relations between these
deviations empirically. The structure given by the matrix
·
of the respective model can be esti-
mated, and the implied impulse responses of different models can be compared. For the validity
of this approach it does not matter whether the variables in the model are stationary or not. The
contemporaneous relations that are considered in the SVAR model are relations between expec-
tation deviations in the theoretical model, and relations between VAR residuals in the empirical
model.21 Both are stationary by definition, regardless of the order of integration of the variables
themselves.22
The structure given by (4.16), however, is not identified. The first and second equation cannot be
distinguished from each other empirically. Therefore, the stylized “two-pillar” monetary policy
rule
N
ê
flfi
ê
@'78T+
ê
+
ê
@H0/f (4.18)
20 See Vanhoose (1985).
21 The approach of specifying a structural model for VAR residuals is also followed by Bernanke and Mihov (1998),
for example, in order to identify monetary policy shocks in the U.S.
22 The effect of integration on estimation and calculation of impulse responses is discussed in section 5.2.
11
is used instead. The model economy can now be described by
òó
óô
3 É3uÑJfi / /
I 3 I /

ê
 / 3 
ê
@
É3 I:@ I:= 3
ö÷
÷
ø
  

òó
óô
Û
fl6
Û
B
Û

Û
78
ö÷
÷
ø

òó
óô
ÎBffi
Î=@&
Î=v&
Î,
ö÷
÷
ø
+ (4.19)
where the third equation is the monetary policy rule and the fourth equation is the money demand
function, such that Î=v& can be interpreted as monetary policy shock (MP) and Î, as money demand
shock (MD). This identification scheme is very similar to the reserve-oriented monetary policy
model. It is less restrictive because the coefficient of the price level in the monetary policy equation
is not restricted to zero like it is the case in the reserve-oriented monetary policy model.
In the empirical analysis of sections 5.2 and 5.3, an additional identification scheme that has been
suggested by Leeper et al. (1996) is applied as a benchmark. This identification scheme is given
by
·

òó
óô
3 / / /
JK@' 3 / /
JKv' JKv,@ 3 JKv
/ / JTv 3
ö÷
÷
ø
f (4.20)
The first and second row represent the behavior of the private sector, and it is assumed that the
financial variables  and 7 have no contemporaneous effect on fl and  . The two private sector
shocks that are identified by this structure are called P  shock and P @ shock later on. The third row
can be interpreted as money demand relation23, and innovations to the fourth equation represent
monetary policy shocks. This set of identifying restrictions is not based on an explicit model but
is rationalized by economic arguments by Leeper et al. (1996).
5 Empirical Application of the Monetary Policy Analysis
Framework
5.1 Puzzles in the Applied SVAR Literature
The SVAR approach has been used in a large number of empirical studies. However, in most of
them the recursive identification scheme is applied.24 Special interest has been put on the iden-
tification of monetary policy shocks and the responses of macroeconomic variables to monetary
policy shocks.25 Within the SVAR approach, monetary policy shocks are calculated by assuming
that the AB-model (4.5) describes the relationships between the estimated VAR residuals and the
underlying economic shocks. The recursive identification scheme is a special case of the AB-model
with
·
iÌ>½ and Í iÇ , where ÇÇ¾5ÂÃ and Ç is lower triangular.26 Using this identification
scheme, many authors have found impulse responses that differ from intuitive economic interpre-
tations. This is especially the case when the analyzed system consists only of the four variables
price level, real output, interest rate, and money stock. Examples are the price puzzle (a positive
23 Another normalization that restricts ffflfiffi to one and not ffflfi fi would make this more evident.
24 There are also studies in which identification is achieved by imposing long-run and short-run restrictions in the way
introduced by Blanchard and Quah (1989). This approach is not considered here.
25 A review of the recent literature on this topic can be found in Christiano et al. (1999).
26 An equivalent specification is !#"%$ Łk and & diagonal.
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response of prices on a positive innovation in the interest rate), and the liquidity puzzle (a non-
negative response of the interest rate on a positive innovation in the money stock). In other words,
there is a liquidity puzzle if no liquidity effect is observed. The liquidity effect is originally defined
in a setup in which monetary policy is described by changes in the money stock. In such a setup,
the initial decline of the interest rate after an increase in the money stock is called liquidity effect,
see for example Dornbusch and Fischer (1994, p. 493 f.). In the following, the notion liquidity
puzzle is used in a broader sense. In addition to the case in which there is no liquidity effect in
the way just described, the case in which the interest rate is the monetary policy variable and the
money stock does not respond negatively on positive interest rate innovations is also called liquid-
ity puzzle. It should be noticed that the liquidity effect is only a short-run effect. As time goes on,
this effect is possibly overcompensated by income and Fisher effect.27
In larger systems of open economies, two additional puzzles sometimes occur: the exchange rate
puzzle (a depreciation of the domestic currency as response on a positive innovation in the do-
mestic interest rate), and the forward discount bias puzzle (appreciation as response to a positive
interest rate differential between domestic and foreign interest rates).28 It has been tried to solve
these puzzles in different ways. Suppose that the central bank increases the interest rate if it expects
a higher level of prices in the future than is compatible with its price stability objective. If actual
innovations in the price level are a leading indicator for future prices then positive innovations
in the price level are responded by an increase in the interest rate. By extending the information
set and including a leading indicator for future prices, the puzzle can possibly be solved. Often,
commodity prices, exchange rates, or an import price index are considered as leading indicators
for the aggregate price level. Sims (1992) shows that the positive response of prices to innova-
tions in the interest rate in VAR models of monetary policy effects in France, Germany, Japan,
the United Kingdom, and the United States tends to become smaller when commodity prices and
exchange rates are included. However, the price puzzle does not disappear in all cases. For the
U.S., it is possible to avoid the price and liquidity puzzles if commodity prices and additional
monetary aggregates like the monetary base are added to the system. This approach is taken in
Leeper et al. (1996) and Christiano et al. (1999). The augmentation makes a separation of different
sources of shocks possible. While the augmentation approach still relies on a recursive identifi-
cation scheme, Leeper et al. (1996) (U.S.) and Kim and Roubini (2000) (non-U.S. G-7 countries)
find non-recursive identification schemes that are successful in avoiding puzzles. Aggregated Euro
area data is analyzed inter alia in Monticelli and Tristani (1999) and Brand and Cassola (2000).
While Monticelli and Tristani (1999) identify structural shocks by imposing an open economy
IS-LM-AS model, Brand and Cassola (2000) use “a theoretically neutral way of deriving impulse
responses” (p. 15) by calculating generalized impulse responses as suggested in Pesaran and Shin
(1998). The open economy model of Monticelli and Tristani (1999) gives German monetary policy
an anchor role within the European exchange rate mechanism (ERM). The response of inflation to
monetary policy shocks is not significantly different from zero and exchange rate effects are very
small. The liquidity puzzle cannot occur because the money stock is not considered in this model.
In the system of Brand and Cassola (2000), there is no liquidity puzzle but the price puzzle still
occurs (the response of the inflation rate on an increase in the short-term or the long-term interest
rate is positive). Impulse responses in German monetary systems are addressed in Lu¨tkepohl and
Wolters (1999) and Benkwitz et al. (2001), for example. In both studies, an import price index is
added without always solving the puzzles.
In the following, it is shown in a simulation example that the recursive identification scheme may
27 These effects are also explained in Dornbusch and Fischer (1994, p. 493 f.).
28 Price and liquidity puzzles are discussed inter alia in Leeper et al. (1996) and Strongin (1995) for the U.S. and in
Kim (1999) for the G-7 countries. Kim and Roubini (2000) analyze also the exchange rate and the forward discount
bias puzzles for non-U.S. G-7 countries.
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be misleading in practice. Consider the price puzzle and let the vector of endogenous variables
be ´fiÈLfl6T+'B,+AT+A78p% . Assume that the true model of the economy is an IS-LM-AS model with
a stylized “two-pillar” monetary policy rule as described by (4.19). The innovations in the third
equation can be interpreted as monetary policy shocks, and the response of the price level in period
2
 on a monetary policy shock in period 2 is given by |

v
, that is the entry in the first row and
third column of the impulse response matrix
î
|
. The calculation of
î
| is explained in section 4.2.
Assume that Íd;Ì½ and denote the entries of the inverse of
·
by J
ú
¶
. Recalling that
î

.
·
fi
Í
,
the contemporaneous response of the price level to a monetary policy shock in the structural model
is  ('


v
 J
v
. In the case of recursive identification, this response is *)


v
 /
. For ,+ 3 , the
impulse responses are calculated by
î
|"
Ä
|
î


, where Ä | are the coefficient matrices of the “non-
structured” MA-representation given in (4.10). The Ä | -matrices are the same for the structural
model and the recursive model and their entries are denoted by - |

ú
¶
. The responses of the price
level on a monetary policy shock in the structural model can now be written as
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('
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while the corresponding response in the recursive identification case is

)
|

v
)fl6v,v
-
|

v< fl/Tv
-
|

.E+ (5.2)
where fl
ú
¶
are the entries of Ç , and flv.)flfi@,v.	/ by definition.
For the simulation, the non-zero entries of
·
in the model given by (4.19) are specified as follows:
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These values are somehow arbitrary, but the signs are compatible with the theoretical model and
the values are realistic in the sense that they reflect plausible economic relationships. Given that
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and
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There is a broad range of Ä | matrices for which  /'|

v and *)|

v can have different signs. The Ä |
matrices depend on the VAR coefficient matrices
·
|
. Consider a VAR with lag length 1. The
matrix
·
 is now generated by a random number generator such that the entries are normally
distributed with the following expected values and standard deviations:
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Figure 1: Simulated Impulse Responses
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Notes: The solid lines in graphs (a), (b), and (c) are the median impulse responses using the respective identification
scheme. In case (a), the impulse responses are computed using the structure given by ! . In cases (b) and (c), the
recursive identification scheme is applied. The dashed lines are upper and lower quartiles. Graph (d) shows the mean
impulse responses of cases (a), (b), and (c).
implying that the variables are autocorrelated, but there are no special assumptions about the dy-
namic relations between the variables. The economic structure is only given by the contempora-
neous relationships expressed by
·
. 10,000
·

-matrices that imply a stable VAR29 and negative
“true” impulse responses30 are computed. Then, impulse responses using the recursive identifi-
cation scheme are calculated and it is counted for how many realizations of
·
 the sum of the
impulse responses for the periods 0 to 16 is positive ( A
B
|
{



)
|

v
Hd/ ). In 27% of the considered
cases, in which the theoretical structural cumulated impulse response is negative, the cumulated
impulse response using the Cholesky decomposition with the ordering fl+Aá+A'+A7$% is positive. One
determinant of the sign of the impulse response is J6

v
, that is the coefficient of the one period
lagged interest rate in the price level equation of the VAR. Even if this coefficient is negative,
the Cholesky decomposition gives positive impulse responses in 5% of the considered cases.31
Impulse responses that are calculated using a recursive identification scheme are in general not
invariant to changes in the ordering of the variables. This can easily be seen when the reverse
ordering is considered. In this case, the response of prices on innovations in the interest rate is
measured by
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29 Only !  matrices are considered for which all roots of Det E F ffiHG ! IKJ "ML lie outside the unit circle.
30 The theoretical impulse responses implied by ! and ! are calculated, and only realizations of ! for which
N
.O
P7Q>RTSVUW
PYX
fi[Z
L are considered. This criterion does not exclude that the impulse response is positive for single
periods, but that does not harm the experiment.
31 It is not clear if this coefficient is positive or negative in an economic model. It measures the average impact of
interest rate changes on the price level. The interest rate can increase for different reasons. If a monetary policy
action is the reason for the increase in the interest rate, a negative impact is expected. However, if the nominal
interest rate rises because expected inflation is increasing, the impact could be positive. Further, a higher interest
rate implies higher financing costs for firms. Therefore, the sign of ff  X fi is not clearly given by economic theory.
This justifies the random choice of the coefficient.
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where the asterisk symbolizes the reverse ordering of the variables. The simulation result, however,
is similar if the ordering of the variables is reversed. 29% of the realizations that imply negative
“true” impulse responses lead to positive impulse responses if the Cholesky decomposition with
reverse ordering 7 +A+A"+?fl% is used, and if the coefficient of the lagged interest rate in the price level
equation is negative, the Cholesky decomposition gives positive impulse responses in 7% of the
cases with “true” negative responses. These results are illustrated in figure 1. Part (b) of the figure
shows that the upper quartiles of the impulse responses implied by the recursive identification
scheme with ordering (fl+'"+A+A7 ) are positive at all horizons though the cumulated true impulse
response is negative. It can be seen in part (d) that in average, the sign is correct, but the impact is
underestimated and the shape depends on the ordering of the variables.
5.2 Empirical Monetary Policy Analysis for Germany
In this section, a small monetary system for Germany is investigated. Impulse responses of macroe-
conomic variables to monetary policy shocks are calculated. It is shown that the kind of problem
described in the previous section possibly occurs when monetary policy shocks in a small mone-
tary system are tried to be identified using a recursive identification scheme. Like in other studies
of the monetary policy transmission process and like suggested by the economic model of section
3, the fl\6 endogenous variables in the SVAR analysis are the logarithmic price level (fl ), the
logarithmic real GDP (  ), an interest rate (  ), and the logarithmic nominal money stock M3 ( 7 ):
´fiõLfl,+AB&+A?T+A78&%p¾
.
32 In the results reported here, a long-term interest rate is used.33 Impulse
responses that are calculated using a recursive identification scheme are compared to impulse re-
sponses that are calculated using the reserve-oriented monetary policy model, the two-pillar mon-
etary policy rule model and the Leeper et al. (1996) identification scheme. The confidence bands
for impulse responses that are used here are calculated by adding and subtracting two asymptotic
standard errors.
First, in section 5.2.1, the VAR is estimated using the level representation and ordinary least
squares. It is known that the considered variables are instationary and potentially cointegrated.
Breitung (2000, Theorem 2.2) shows, that impulse responses can be efficiently estimated from the
unrestricted VAR as well as from a vector error correction model (VECM) with correctly imposed
cointegration rank. In small samples, however, as claimed by Breitung (2000, p. 75), it “may be ad-
vantageous to use a VECM representation with a proper cointegration rank to estimate the impulse
responses.” Therefore, the reduced rank regression technique is applied to estimate the VECM in
section 5.2.2. From the VECM representation, the level representation can be recovered, and the
structural analysis can be undertaken in the same way as if the level representation was estimated
directly. The results of this procedure are compared to those of the unrestricted VAR case.
5.2.1 Calculation of Impulse Responses from the Level Representation
VAR Specification. The sample period for this analysis is 1975 to 1998, and the data is quarterly
(for details see A.1). For this period, the reserve-oriented model is a considerable approximation to
monetary policy in Germany. However, as shown in Holtemo¨ller (2001a), there is some empirical
evidence that does not support the reserve-oriented monetary policy model. Therefore, the two-
pillar monetary policy rule model is not excluded a priori.
32 The data is described in Appendix A.
33 The same analysis has also been conducted using a short-term interest rate instead. The results are very similar to
those reported here.
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The VAR model is specified as follows:
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where µ" comprises the following deterministic terms: constant, linear time trend, seasonal dum-
mies, the step dummy DS902, and lags one to four of DS902.34 The lag length selection criteria
suggest one (SC), one (HQ), and seven (AIC) lags. Starting with the most parsimonious lag speci-
fication (SC, HQ: one), lags have been added until there seems to be no substantial autocorrelation
left in the residuals which is the case for ³  4. The residual correlation matrix is
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from which can be seen that there is still correlation between the residuals.35 This remaining
correlation is analyzed in the following structural analysis. All impulse responses are depicted but
only the impulse responses related to monetary policy are discussed in the text. The figures have to
be read as follows. The columns represent the various innovations or shocks, and in the rows, the
response of a variable to the respective shocks is presented. The label dcõ7 , for example, means
the response of the money stock on an innovation in the interest rate. In case of non-recursive
identification schemes, the innovations in the respective equations can be interpreted explicitly as
economic shocks, and MP c fl , for example, means the response of the price level on a monetary
policy shock. As mentioned before, the confidence bands are computed by adding and subtracting
two asymptotic standard errors.
(a) Recursive Identification. Impulse responses on innovations in 7 (figure 2) and  (figure 3) that
are calculated using the recursive identification scheme and the ordering fl+Aá+A'+'7$% are shown in
column (a) of figures 2 and 3 in Appendix D.36 This ordering is chosen because it can be assumed
that the financial variables  and 7 have no contemporaneous effect on inflation and output but
have an effect in later periods. This ordering is also chosen by Leeper et al. (1996). The liquidity
puzzle can be observed: innovations in the money stock have a positive effect on the interest rate.
An increase in the money stock has the expected positive effect on the future price level and only
a small and merely significant impact on output. The price puzzle occurs: the response of prices
on a positive innovation in the interest rate is positive.
(b) Reserve-oriented Monetary Policy Model. The identification scheme that is implied by the
reserve-oriented monetary policy model is given in equation (4.15). The matrices
·
and Í are
estimated in the way described in section 4, and the results of this estimation are reported in table
2, Appendix C. The corresponding impulse responses can be seen in column (b) of figures 2 and 3.
34 DS902 is zero up to the first quarter of 1990, and one afterwards. With this dummy variable the structural break in
the data due to the German unification is modeled.
35 The correlation between the different residuals is only weakly significant. If the residual correlation matrix was
an identity matrix, the residuals would already be orthogonal. However, comparing the forecast error impulse
responses (which are given by e P in equation (4.10), but are not depicted here) with the orthogonalized impulse
responses shows that there is some systematic information left in the residual cross correlations. This is reflected
by significant non-zero contemporaneous orthogonalized impulse responses.
36 The impulse responses on innovations in  and f are not of interest in this context. They are depicted in a longer
version of this paper that is available on the author’s homepage.
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The innovation in the interest rate equation can be interpreted as a money demand shock (MD), and
the innovation in the money equation as a monetary supply shock (MS). An increase in the money
stock leads to increasing future prices, and also to a contemporaneous decrease in the interest rate
(this is not obvious in the figure but can be confirmed by looking at the numerical values of the
impulse response and the corresponding standard error). After a short time, however, the interest
rate increases. This effect can possibly be explained by the Fisher effect. Individuals expect the
increase in the price level and adjust their inflation expectations. Adding the real interest rate and
increasing expected inflation yields the increasing nominal interest rate. In the third column it can
be seen that a price puzzle does not occur: a shock that increases the interest rate does not lead
to increasing prices. This set of impulse responses is therefore more compatible with standard
assumptions about reactions to innovations in money stock and interest rate than the one implied
by the recursive identification scheme.
(c) Two-pillar Monetary Policy Rule Model. The estimated stylized two-pillar monetary policy
rule is given in the third row of the
·
-matrix in the middle part of table 2. Innovations in the
money stock have the expected impact on the interest rate, but the actual innovations in the price
level enter the monetary policy rule with the wrong sign. Therefore, the impulse responses implied
by this structure may not be as expected, too. They are depicted in column (c) of figures 2 and
2. The money demand shock is essentially the same as in the reserve-oriented monetary policy
model, and the monetary policy shock in column (c) is essentially the negative money supply
shock in column(b). Given the wrong sign and non-significance of the price level coefficient in the
two-pillar monetary policy rule, the reserve-oriented monetary policy model, in which the money
stock is the monetary policy variable, seems to be a reasonable approximation to monetary policy
in Germany from 1975 to 1998.
(d) Leeper et al. (1996) Identification Scheme. For comparison purposes, the Leeper et al. (1996)
identification scheme, that is described by (4.20), is also considered. The SVAR estimation results
can be found in the lower part of table 2, and the corresponding impulse responses are shown in
column (d) of figures 2 and 3. The money demand shock has sensible responses, there is no price
puzzle. Furthermore, as the fourth column shows, an increase in the money stock has a positive
impact on the future price level. However, there remains a liquidity puzzle.
In the next section, the robustness of these results is examined by repeating the analysis using a
vector error correction model (VECM) instead of the VAR model in levels.
5.2.2 Calculation of Impulse Responses from the VECM Representation
VECM Specification. The analysis in Holtemo¨ller (2001a) has shown that the variables consid-
ered here are not stationary but integrated of order one. To incorporate this stochastic property of
the data, the following VECM is estimated:
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where
 
 is the step dummy DS902 for the German unification, and µ contains a constant, sea-
sonal dummies, and the first differences of DS902 up to lag three. The Johansen trace test on
cointegration is applied in combination with simulated critical values that consider the presence of
a dummy variable that is restricted to the cointegration space. The results of the Johansen trace
test are (5% critical values in brackets, the construction of these critical values is explained in
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Holtemo¨ller (2001a)):  


114.30 (56.02),  

48.41 (35.38),  @

16.25 (19.80), and  v

5.18
(5.89).  | is the hypothesis that the cointegration rank is at most  . The hypothesis is rejected for
<;/ and <d3 at a significance level of 5%, such that a cointegration rank of two is applied.37
The residual correlation matrix is
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The signs are the same as in the residual correlation matrix obtained from the estimation of the
VAR in levels. The magnitudes are slightly different, but there is still contemporaneous correlation
between the residuals, see also footnote 35. Now, the VAR representation is derived from the
estimated VECM such that impulse responses can be calculated.
(a) Recursive Identification. The ordering of the variables is as before: (fl+Aá+A'+A7 ). The impulse
responses implied by the VECM and the recursive identification scheme are plotted in column (a)
of figures 4 and 5. Most of the responses are as expected. There is no liquidity effect, and the price
puzzle can still be observed. It should be mentioned that the effect of an increasing money stock
on the price level is now of permanent nature. The possibility of permanent impacts of shocks is
introduced by considering the instationary behavior of the variables. In stable VARs, the impulse
responses converge always to zero with increasing horizon.
(b) Reserve-oriented Monetary Policy Model. From table 3 it can be seen that the point estimates
for the entries of the matrix
·
are very similar to those calculated form the VAR level represen-
tation. In general, this is also true for the impulse responses (column (b) in figures 4 and 5), but
there are some differences. For example the price puzzle is not solved in this specification, and the
impact of an increase in the interest rate on output is now permanent and not transitory. Finally, the
small initial liquidity effect can also be observed here, but without the overcompensating effects
that are observed in figure 2. However, the result of the model in levels that the reserve-oriented
monetary policy model seems to be a valid identification scheme for Germany is supported by the
structural VECM.
(c) Two-pillar Monetary Policy Rule Model. In case of the two-pillar monetary policy rule iden-
tification scheme, the point estimates for the entries of
·
– given in the middle part of table 3 –
differ from the corresponding estimates in table 2. For example, the monetary policy rule is now
estimated with plausible signs, and smaller standard errors. The impulse responses look also con-
vincing, see column (c) in figures 4 and 5. Restrictive monetary policy shocks have a negative
impact on the price level. However, this effect dies out after a few periods. There is also a liquidity
effect in the sense that the money stock is negatively affected by the monetary policy variable in
this model, namely  . However, the positive innovations in the money stock have a positive impact
on the interest rate. Therefore, the reserve-oriented monetary policy model may still be regarded
as the most appropriate identification scheme for the monetary transmission process in Germany.
37 The cointegration relations are not reported here, and they are not used in the further analysis. Of course, it is
possible to combine a detailed specification of the cointegration relations with the SVAR methodology. This is for
example done in Bru¨ggemann (2001).
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(d) Leeper et al. (1996) Identification Scheme. Applying the Leeper et al. (1996) identification
scheme in the VECM gives again a very similar picture to that in the unrestricted VAR case. The
estimates for
·
and Í can be found in the lower part of table 3 and the impulse responses are
depicted in column (d) in figures 4 and 5. The impulse responses differ from the responses in case
of the unrestricted VAR only in the permanence of some effects.
5.3 Empirical Monetary Policy Analysis for the Euro Area
The sample period for the following analysis of monetary policy effects in the Euro Area (without
Greece) is 1980:1 to 1999:4. The data is quarterly and seasonally unadjusted, for details see data
appendix. The vector of endogenous variables consists of the same variables as before: ´fiY
Lfl6T+'B,+AT+A78p%p¾
, where  is again a long-term interest rate. This application should be interpreted as
an example for future investigation because there has been no single monetary policy in the Euro
Area in the sample period. The assumption of an area wide monetary policy in this sample period
has also been made by Monticelli and Tristani (1999) and Brand and Cassola (2000).
5.3.1 Calculation of Impulse Responses from the Level Representation
As a VAR model for the Euro Area, equation (5.7) can be applied, but µ now comprises only a
constant, seasonal dummies and a linear time trend. Other dummy variables are not needed in this
case because the data is adjusted for the German unification (and also other structural breaks like
reclassifications or area changes) by the ECB. The lag lengths suggested by information criteria are
one (SC), six (HQ), and eight (AIC). While a lag length of one does not remove all autocorrelation
from the VAR residuals, there seems to be no substantial autocorrelation left after adding lags up
to lag length four. Therefore, the lag length is set to ³  4. The residual correlation matrix is
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which exhibits some differences compared to the residual correlation matrix in the German case.38
It might be expected that the impulse responses also show a different picture.
(a) Recursive Identification. Using the recursive identification scheme, the price puzzle can also
be observed in the Euro Area, see column (a) in figure 7. Additionally, it can be seen that innova-
tions in the money stock lead to future increases in the price level, see column (a) in figure 6. The
responses of the interest rate and the money stock on each other are not significant in large parts
of the considered horizon, a liquidity effect cannot be observed.
(b) Reserve-oriented Monetary Policy Model. The estimates for
·
and Í are given in table 4.
Despite the fact that by far not all of the Euro area countries have followed a reserve-oriented
monetary policy, the impulse responses for this case in column (b) of figures 6 and 7 give a more
plausible picture than those implied by the recursive identification scheme. However, there is
still a small positive impact of an increase in the interest rate on the price level after six quarters.
38 It is again assumed that the residual correlation matrix is not an identity matrix. This assumption is in the following
supported by significant contemporaneous orthogonalized impulse responses for innovation-response combinations
with two different variables.
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The liquidity effect can clearly be seen in the MS schock c  impulse response: A positive
innovation in the money stock leads to a contemporaneous decrease in the interest rate. This
effect is (over)compensated after some quarters by the income and/or Fisher effect that have been
described earlier. The response of the price level on a money supply shock is also as expected: The
price level increases with a considerable time lag after a positive innovation in the money stock
has occurred.
(c) Two-pillar Monetary Policy Rule Model. As discussed in section 4.3, this model can be in-
terpreted as an approximation to the monetary policy strategy of the ECB. Like it is the case in the
analysis for Germany, the impulse responses implied by this identification scheme are very similar
to those calculated with the reserve-oriented monetary policy identification scheme. A contractive
monetary policy shock expressed by a positive innovation in the interest rate has a negative impact
on the price level after nine to twelve quarters, a small and transitory negative effect on real output,
and a negative impact on the money stock. The price puzzle cannot be observed. However, the
estimated monetary policy rule is not convincing because the coefficient of prices has the wrong
sign, but is not significant, see table 4. This can possibly be explained by the fact that price stability
in the euro area has not had the same importance in the sample period as it has nowadays. The
positive contemporaneous effect of a positive innovation in the money stock on the interest rate is
still puzzling.
(d) Leeper et al. (1996) Identification Scheme. For the Euro area, the Leeper et al. (1996) iden-
tification scheme seems to be not appropriate. The price puzzle occurs, and the response of the
price level on a monetary policy shock, represented by column (d) of figure 6, is not plausible: an
expansive monetary policy shock that increases the money stock and decreases the interest rate has
a negative impact on the future price level.
5.3.2 Calculation of Impulse Responses from the VECM Representation
VECM Specification. The stochastic properties of the considered Euro area time series are dif-
ferent from the corresponding German time series. While nominal money is an I(1) variable in
Germany, the Euro area money stock M3 is an I(2) variable.39 The vector error correction model
in the I(2) case can be written as:
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µ contains again the deterministic terms. The exact specification of the deterministic terms is
determined together with the cointegration indices j (number of I(0) relations) and ë (number of
I(1) relations) using the test procedure described in Holtemo¨ller (2001b). The values of the test
statistic ^ml
 n
can be found in table 1. Following the arguments of Juselius (1998), the cointegration
indices are not only determined on the basis of the test results but also on the basis of economic
plausibility. At a significance level of 5%, the test procedure stops at model 2, jY Ð , and ë /
implying fl9;jcSë_ Ð stochastic I(2) trends. The difference between ^ @


  35.65 and the
corresponding 5% critical value (36.12) is very small. The next test statistic in the test procedure
is ^ @

4 25.00 with a corresponding critical value of 26.00. This scenario is much more plausible
from an economic point of view. The I(2) variables in this system are 7 and fl , and it is shown
39 The order of integration of Euro area money and prices is analyzed in Holtemo¨ller (2001b). The statistical analysis
of I(2) variables is also explained there.
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Table 1: Testing Hypotheses about the Cointegration Indices, Euro Area System
j Model ^ml
 n o
l
0 2 172.13 128.97 111.55 102.48 100.31
3.1 172.13 125.83 105.89 93.93 87.93
3.2 170.01 123.71 103.85 92.35 87.93
1 2 96.55 67.44 56.42 53.76
3.1 101.30 64.60 49.28 42.69
3.2 98.21 62.19 47.75 42.69
2 2 35.65 25.00 22.93
3.1 39.63 26.58 18.38
3.2 36.53 24.27 18.38
3 2 13.26 8.31
3.1 12.94 8.30
3.2 9.00 8.30
flQ_jIDë 4 3 2 1 0
Notes: Test statistic pq X r for testing hypotheses about the cointegration indices and the deterministic terms as described
in Holtemo¨ller (2001b). The column Model refers to the deterministic model, see Holtemo¨ller (2001b) and Mosconi
(1998, p. 27). Centered seasonal dummies are included in all cases. A hypothesis is not rejected if the test statistic is
smaller than the corresponding critical value. These cases are indicated by bold face. The critical values can be found
in the Holtemo¨ller (2001b), for example.
in Holtemo¨ller (2001b) that these two variables cointegrate to an I(1) relation. Therefore, the
cointegration indices jQ Ð and ëÆ3 are chosen. Now, the VECM (5.12) is estimated using the
two-step reduced rank estimation procedure.40 The residual correlation matrix is
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which is very similar to the residual correlation in the unrestricted VAR model.
(a) Recursive Identification. The impulse responses in this case, see column (a) of figures 8 and
9 are almost the same as in the unrestricted VAR case. That is, the price puzzle can be observed,
and a liquidity effect cannot be seen. The only difference is that the responses of some variables,
for example the response of real income to an innovation in the price level, diverge. This is a
consequence of the I(2) specification.
(b) Reserve-oriented Monetary Policy Model. The estimated matrices
·
and Í exhibit only mi-
nor differences to their counterparts in the unrestricted VAR case, see table 5. Consequently, the
impulse responses look also very similar, which can be seen by comparing figures 6/7 and 8/9.
40 The two-step estimation procedure proposed by Johansen (1995) is explained in Holtemo¨ller (2001b). The I(2)
VECM is estimated using the RATS application Malcolm 2.2. The following structural analysis is again performed
with Mathematica using the level representation of the VECM reported by Malcolm.
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(c) Two-pillar Monetary Policy Rule Model. This model describes the monetary transmission
process equally well as in the unrestricted VAR case, see column (c) of figures 8 and 9. In par-
ticular, there is no price puzzle, the price level responds negatively to positive innovations in the
interest rate after about 6 quarters. Additionally, a liquidity effect can be observed in the sense that
positive innovations in the interest rate lower the money stock. The sign of the price level coeffi-
cient in the two-pillar monetary policy rule is still not compatible with the theoretical expectation,
see table 5.
(d) Leeper et al. (1996) Identification Scheme. For the Leeper et al. (1996) identification scheme
apply the same remarks as in the unrestricted VAR case. The impulse responses are not as plausible
as in the two-pillar monetary policy rule model.
5.4 Summary and Critique of Empirical Results
One finding of the empirical investigation of monetary policy shocks and the responses of macroe-
conomic variables on these shocks is that the choice of the identification scheme has a considerable
impact on the sign and the shape of the impulse responses. Therefore, it seems important to have
a plausible economic interpretation of the applied identification scheme. The recursive identifica-
tion scheme has not to be excluded a priori; there may be applications in which the recursiveness
is a property of the “true” model. However, in many cases a model based identification scheme is
presumably preferred. The reserve-oriented model for Germany and the stylized two-pillar mone-
tary policy model for the Euro area seem to be appropriate identification schemes in the sense that
they produce impulse responses that are compatible with widely accepted assumptions about the
monetary transmission process.
However, it is not clear so far, how long-run cointegration analysis and short-run structural analysis
influence each other. As noticed above, the impulse responses do not depend on the way the VAR
is estimated; the unrestricted VAR and the VECM produce the same impulse responses, at least
asymptotically and if the cointegration restrictions are correctly specified. This can well be seen
in the Euro area investigation. The results of the impulse response analysis are very similar in the
unrestricted VAR case and in the VECM case. On the other hand, Benkwitz et al. (2001) show that
in empirical applications not only the width of confidence bands but also the impulse responses
themselves can be different when they are estimated from the unrestricted VAR model and from
the restricted VECM.
In practice, it may be helpful to specify the long-run cointegration relations first, and use this infor-
mation for the identification of the contemporaneous relationships. A study proceeding in this way
is the analysis of a German money demand system by Lu¨tkepohl and Wolters (1999). These authors
consider the variables real money, gross national product, inflation, and interest rate spread. First,
they specify a money demand cointegration relation applying a single equation error correction
approach; then, they include the resulting error-correction term and lagged differences of the en-
dogenous variables into a structural model for the first differences. The structural model allows for
contemporaneous relations between the variables and is estimated using three-stage least squares.
An elimination procedure is applied to eliminate insignificant regressors. The estimated structural
form is then used to calculate forecast error impulse responses. This procedure has the disadvan-
tage that a large number of restrictions stems from a sequential statistical elimination process such
that the economic implications imposed by these restrictions are not easy to see. Furthermore, the
single equation estimation of the cointegrating vector is only valid if the cointegration rank is one.
However, this procedure takes also care of the well known problem that the number of estimated
parameters in a VAR model is relatively large. The larger the number of parameters, the larger are
23
the variances of the estimators and the confidence bands of the impulse response functions. Within
the VAR framework this problem can alternatively be addressed in the following way: the number
of parameters can be reduced by imposing (zero) restrictions on some of the coefficients in the ma-
trices
·
|
.
41 A consequence of imposing restrictions on the VAR parameters is that the likelihood
function for the estimation of the structural parameters in the matrices
·
and Í cannot be calcu-
lated like it is done in section 4.1, see for example (Hamilton, 1994, p. 331 f.). The combination
of subset VAR model and SVAR model may be an interesting topic for further research.
6 Conclusions
In this paper, the monetary policy conception in Germany from 1975 to 1998, the monetary policy
strategy in the Euro area from 1999 up to now, and the respective implementation by the Bundes-
bank and the European Central Bank are explained. Both the Bundesbank and the Eurosystem are
committed to maintain price stability. While the monetary policy of the Bundesbank from 1975 to
1998 can be described as monetary targeting, the Eurosystem has adopted a two-pillar strategy that
focuses on the money stock as well as on other risks to price stability. The Eurosystem strategy
should not be confused with monetary targeting. An interest rate rule seems more appropriate to
describe the way how monetary policy is implemented in the Euro area.
A theoretical framework is developed that allows to incorporate the differences in monetary poli-
cies in empirical models of the monetary transmission process. This framework consists of an
IS-LM-AS model extended by a regime specific monetary policy rule. It is shown how this frame-
work can be combined with the SVAR methodology. Finally, the framework is applied to analyze
monetary policy in Germany and in the Euro area empirically. For Germany a reserve-oriented
monetary policy model, and for the Euro area, a stylized two-pillar monetary policy rule model
work reasonably well. While the widely used recursive identification scheme (Cholesky decom-
position) fails to produce impulse responses that are compatible with standard assumptions about
the monetary transmission mechanism, the two model based identification schemes suggested here
produce sensible impulse response sets. The main conclusion is therefore that the statistical VAR
model should be augmented with economic structure in empirical applications. This can be done
by cointegration analysis and by analyzing the contemporaneous relationships between the vari-
ables using the SVAR approach like illustrated here.
41 VAR models with restrictions on some of the coefficients are called subset VAR models, see for example Bru¨gge-
mann and Lu¨tkepohl (2001).
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Appendix A. Data
A.1 German Data
M3: End of month money stock M3 (currency in use plus sight deposits of domestic non-banks
at domestic banks in Germany plus time deposits for less than four years of domestic non-
banks at domestic banks plus savings deposits at three months’ notice of domestic non-
banks at domestic banks in Germany) in billions of DM, seasonally unadjusted. Monthly
data (TU0800) from the Compact Disc Deutsche Bundesbank (1998), continued with data
from the monthly bulletin of the Deutsche Bundesbank, table II.2. 1975:01-1990:5 West
Germany, and 1990:06-1998:12 Germany, not adjusted for German unification. Quarterly
data are end of quarter stocks.
Nominal GDP: Gross domestic product in current prices, in billions of DM, seasonally unad-
justed. Quarterly data (DQ0727) for 1975:01-1990:02, West Germany, from the Compact
Disc Deutsche Bundesbank (1998), continued with data for 1990:03-1998:04, Germany,
from Deutsches Institut fu¨r Wirtschaftsforschung (DIW) Berlin (from the DIW-statfinder:
http://www.diw-berlin.de).
Real GDP: Gross domestic product in 1991 prices, in billions of DM, seasonally unadjusted.
Quarterly data for 1975:01-1990:02, West Germany, from the Compact Disc Deutsche Bun-
desbank (1998) (DQ0728). Data for 1990:03-1998:04, Germany, is calculated as the ratio of
nominal GDP and GDP deflator.
GDP deflator: Nominal GDP divided by real GDP, 1975:01-1990:02, quarterly data, West Ger-
many, continued with GDP deflator, 1990:03-1998:04, quarterly data, Germany, from DIW
Berlin (DIW-statfinder: http://www.diw-berlin.de).
Long-term interest rate: Yields on bonds outstanding issued by residents, monthly averages,
fractions, monthly data (WU0017) from the Compact Disc Deutsche Bundesbank (1998),
continued with data from the monthly bulletin, table VII.5. Quarterly data are the respective
values of the last month in a quarter.
A.2 Euro Area Data
The Euro area data was provided by Nuno Cassola. Further notes on the construction of the euro
area aggregates (11 countries) before the introduction of the euro (back to 1980) can be found
in Brand and Cassola (2000). The definition of the variables is as follows (adjusted stocks are
constructed with flow statistics):
M3: Adjusted stock of the euro area monetary aggregate M3 in billions of euro. The quarterly
data are averages of monthly data. The index of stocks (December 1998 = 100) is multiplied
by the December 1998 stock of M3. The percentage change between any two dates (after
October 1997) corresponds to the change in the aggregate excluding the effect of reclassi-
fications etc. M3 comprises M1 and in addition, deposits with agreed maturity up to two
years, deposits redeemable at notice up to three months (M2) and marketable instruments
issued by the MFI sector (repurchase agreements, money market fund shares, money market
paper and debt securities up to two years).
Real GDP s
l
% : National series on real gross domestic product at market prices are added after
they have been rebased to a common base year (1995) and converted to euro via the irrevoca-
ble fixed conversion rates of 31 December 1998. Adjusted for German unification. Billions
of euro.
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Nominal GDP ts % : National series on nominal gross domestic product at market prices are
added after they have been converted to euro via the irrevocable fixed conversion rates of
31 December 1998. Adjusted for German unification. Billions of euro. ESA95 data to the
widest extent possible.
GDP Deflator (GDPP): Nominal GDP divided by real GDP.
Long-term interest rate: Weighted average of euro-11 annual long-term interest rates. Weights:
GDP weights at purchasing power parity exchange rates in 1995. National series are from
the Bank for International Settlements, 10-year government bond yield or closest substitute.
Fractions.
Appendix B. Numerical Maximization of the SVAR
Log-Likelihood Function
The method described in this section is a method of the Marquardt type, that is, it is an extension
of the method of scoring in order to reduce numerical problems, especially in the case of a near
singular information matrix. The method belongs to the class of ordinary gradient methods and
can be characterized by the iteration algorithm42
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where the variables that are freely estimated are collected in the row vector ¾ , that is in the actual
case ¾Ê ©
ê
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. The positive scalar ¢ W is the step size of each iteration step, and a W is the
direction vector which is defined as the product of a weighting matrix u W and the gradient of the
objective function in row form, evaluated at  W :
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While the Newton-Raphson method, that is derived from a second-order Taylor series expansion
around  W , uses the negative inverse of the Hessian
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as weighting matrix, the method of scoring replaces the Hessian with the negative of the informa-
tion matrix
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The above mentioned extension is captured by
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The parameter { is determined by
{ ;~
ä
}vw2x

+ (2.7)
where ~ is the largest eigenvalue of  , and
ä
is chosen individually depending on the goodness
of the quadratic approximation of the objective function that has been used above in the Taylor
42 This follows Goldfeld and Quandt (1972) and Judge et al. (1988).
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series expansion (
ä
is increasing if the approximation is poor). The iterating rule is now (2.6) if
{H/ and (2.5) if {|;/ . The iteration algorithm stops if usual convergence criteria are achieved
(absolute/relative increase in the log-likelihood or absolute/relative change in  are below a certain
bound or a total number of iterations is reached).
The gradient vector and the information matrix are given in Amisano and Giannini (1997). The
calculations in section 5 are done using a Mathematica implementation of this algorithm. A version
of this paper with more technical details is available on the author’s homepage.
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Appendix C. SVAR Estimation Results
Table 2: SVAR Results, Germany, VAR Model (5.7)
Reserve-oriented Monetary Policy Model (4.15)
Number of iteration steps is 36. The maximized log-likelihood is 1293.76
·
Í
fl   7 ÎB Î=@ Î=v Î
IS 2.26 1 2.26 0 0.02 0 0 0
(0.96) – (0.96) – (0.00) – – –
AS  9.36 1 0 0 0 0.04 0 0
(4.48) – – – – (0.02) – –
MD  1  2.92 11.58 1 0 0 0.07 0
– (3.69) (16.05) – – – (0.09) –
MS 0 0  0.26 1 0 0 0 0.01
– – (0.25) – – – – (0.00)
Two-pillar Monetary Policy Rule Model (4.19)
Number of iteration steps is 34. The maximized log-likelihood is 1296.06
·
Í
fl   7 ÎB Î=@ Î=v Î
AS 1  0.94 0 0 0.00 0 0 0
– (0.05) – – (0.00) – – –
IS 2.04 1 2.04 0 0 0.02 0 0
(4.85) – (0.85) – – (0.00) – –
MP 1.33 0 1  3.06 0 0 0.02 0
(1.16) – – (2.41) – – (0.02) –
MD  1  2.97 12.25 1 0 0 0 0.07
– (4.29) (18.88) – – – – (0.11)
Leeper et al. (1996) Identification Scheme (4.20)
Number of iteration steps is 15. The maximized log-likelihood is 1297.14
·
Í
fl   7 ÎB Î=@ Î=v Î
P  1 0 0 0 0.00 0 0 0
– – – – (0.00) – – –
P @ 0.30 1 0 0 0 0.02 0 0
(0.37) – – – – (0.00) – –
MD 0.43  0.08 1  0.52 0 0 0.01 0
(0.18) (0.05) – (0.28) – – (0.00) –
MP 0 0 1.29 1 0 0 0 0.01
– – (0.86) – – – – (0.00)
Notes: SVAR estimation algorithm as described in Appendix B. The algorithm stops if the relative change of the
log-likelihood is smaller than 0.00001. Standard errors in brackets.
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Table 3: SVAR Results, Germany, VECM (5.9)
Reserve-oriented Monetary Policy Model (4.15)
Number of iteration steps is 36. The maximized log-likelihood is 1337.43
·
Í
fl   7 ÎB Î=@ Î=v Î
IS 1.67 1 1.67 0 0.02 0 0 0
(0.81) – (0.81) – (0.00) – – –
AS  11.54 1 0 0 0 0.05 0 0
(6.88) – – – – (0.02) – –
MD  1  2.63 11.30 1 0 0 0.06 0
– (3.54) (17.03) – – – (0.09) –
MS 0 0  0.20 1 0 0 0 0.01
– – (0.27) – – – – (0.00)
Two-pillar Monetary Policy Rule Model (4.19)
Number of iteration steps is 48. The maximized log-likelihood is 1337.27
·
Í
fl   7 ÎB Î=@ Î=v Î
AS 1  7.57 0 0 0.10 0 0 0
– (27.07) – – (0.35) – – –
IS 20.16 1 20.16 0 0 0.11 0 0
(22.38) – (22.38) – – (0.13) – –
MP  1.62 0 1  0.51 0 0 0.01 0
(0.46) – – (0.19) – – (0.00) –
MD  1 0.01 0.27 1 0 0 0 0.01
– (0.07) (0.22) – – – – (0.00)
Leeper et al. (1996) Identification Scheme (4.20)
Number of iteration steps is 15. The maximized log-likelihood is 1339.94
·
Í
fl   7 ÎB Î=@ Î=v Î
P  1 0 0 0 0.00 0 0 0
– – – – (0.00) – – –
P @ 0.33 1 0 0 0 0.01 0 0
(0.37) – – – – (0.00) – –
MD 0.37  0.07 1  0.67 0 0 0.01 0
(0.23) (0.06) – (0.51) – – (0.00) –
MP 0 0 1.57 1 0 0 0 0.01
– – (1.31) – – – – (0.00)
Notes: SVAR estimation algorithm as described in Appendix B. The algorithm stops if the relative change of the
log-likelihood is smaller than 0.00001. Standard errors in brackets.
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Table 4: SVAR Results, Euro Area, VAR Model (5.7)
Reserve-oriented Monetary Policy Model (4.15)
Number of iteration steps is 17. The maximized log-likelihood is 1257.51
·
Í
fl   7 ÎB Î=@ Î=v Î
IS 2.23 1 2.23 0 0.01 0 0 0
(1.42) – (1.42) – (0.01) – – –
AS  3.43 1 0 0 0 0.01 0 0
(0.82) – – – – (0.00) – –
MD  1  0.61 2.84 1 0 0 0.01 0
– (0.38) (1.83) – – – (0.01) –
MP 0 0  0.58 1 0 0 0 0.00
– – (0.21) – – – – (0.00)
Two-pillar Monetary Policy Rule Model (4.19)
Number of iteration steps is 19. The maximized log-likelihood is 1257.89
·
Í
fl   7 ÎB Î=@ Î=v Î
AS 1  0.25 0 0 0.00 0 0 0
– (0.10) – – (0.00) – – –
IS 1.51 1 1.51 0 0 0.01 0 0
(1.62) – (1.62) – – (0.01) – –
MP 0.31 0 1  2.07 0 0 0.01 0
(0.60) – – (1.24) – – (0.00) –
MD  1  0.86 4.69 1 0 0 0 0.02
– (1.01) (6.99) – – – – (0.02)
Leeper et al. (1996) Identification Scheme (4.20)
Number of iteration steps is 16. The maximized log-likelihood is 1257.60
·
Í
fl   7 ÎB Î=@ Î=v Î
P  1 0 0 0 0.00 0 0 0
– – – – (0.00) – – –
P @  1.21 1 0 0 0 0.01 0 0
(0.31) – – – – (0.00) – –
MD  0.46  0.08 1 2.45 0 0 0.01 0
(1.06) (0.23) – (6.20) – – (0.02) –
MP 0 0  2.18 1 0 0 0 0.01
– – (3.02) – – – – (0.01)
Notes: SVAR estimation algorithm as described in Appendix B. The algorithm stops if the relative change of the
log-likelihood is smaller than 0.00001. Standard errors in brackets.
30
Table 5: SVAR Results, Euro Area, VECM (5.12)
Reserve-oriented Monetary Policy Model (4.15)
Number of iteration steps is 18. The maximized log-likelihood is 1298.53
·
Í
fl   7 ÎB Î=@ Î=v Î
IS 2.43 1 2.43 0 0.01 0 0 0
(1.72) – (1.72) – (0.01) – – –
AS  3.72 1 0 0 0 0.01 0 0
(0.87) – – – – (0.00) – –
MD  1  0.64 3.28 1 0 0 0.01 0
– (0.43) (2.29) – – – (0.01) –
MS 0 0  0.54 1 0 0 0 0.00
– – (0.20) – – – – (0.00)
Two-pillar Monetary Policy Rule Model (4.19)
Number of iteration steps is 20. The maximized log-likelihood is 1298.93
·
Í
fl   7 ÎB Î=@ Î=v Î
AS 1  0.23 0 0 0.00 0 0 0
– (0.09) – – (0.00) – – –
IS 1.62 1 1.62 0 0 0.01 0 0
(1.93) – (1.93) – – (0.01) – –
MP 0.30 0 1  2.19 0 0 0.01 0
(0.62) – – (1.38) – – (0.00) –
MD  1  0.88 5.24 1 0 0 0 0.02
– (1.13) (8.43) – – – – (0.02)
Leeper et al. (1996) Identification Scheme (4.20)
Number of iteration steps is 14. The maximized log-likelihood is 1298.60
·
Í
fl   7 ÎB Î=@ Î=v Î
P  1 0 0 0 0.00 0 0 0
– – – – (0.00) – – –
P @  1.43 1 0 0 0 0.01 0 0
(0.33) – – – – (0.00) – –
MD  0.32  0.06 1 1.78 0 0 0.01 0
(0.60) (0.14) – (3.75) – – (0.01) –
MP 0 0  1.82 1 0 0 0 0.01
– – (2.32) – – – – (0.00)
Notes: SVAR estimation algorithm as described in Appendix B. The algorithm stops if the relative change of the
log-likelihood is smaller than 0.00001. Standard errors in brackets.
31
Appendix D. Impulse Responses
Figure 2: Impulse Responses, Germany, VAR Model (5.7)
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Notes: Identification schemes: (a) recursive (4 ), (b) reserve-oriented model, (c) two-pillar monetary policy
rule model, (d) Leeper et al. (1996).
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Figure 3: Impulse Responses, Germany, VAR Model (5.7)
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Notes: Identification schemes: (a) recursive (4 ), (b) reserve-oriented model, (c) two-pillar monetary policy
rule model, (d) Leeper et al. (1996).
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Figure 4: Impulse Responses, Germany, VECM (5.9)
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Notes: Identification schemes: (a) recursive (4 ), (b) reserve-oriented model, (c) two-pillar monetary policy
rule model, (d) Leeper et al. (1996).
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Figure 5: Impulse Responses, Germany, VECM Model (5.9)
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Notes: Identification schemes: (a) recursive (4 ), (b) reserve-oriented model, (c) two-pillar monetary policy
rule model, (d) Leeper et al. (1996).
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Figure 6: Impulse Responses, Euro Area, VAR Model (5.7)
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Notes: Identification schemes: (a) recursive (4 ), (b) reserve-oriented model, (c) two-pillar monetary policy
rule model, (d) Leeper et al. (1996).
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Figure 7: Impulse Responses, Euro Area, VAR Model (5.7)
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Notes: Identification schemes: (a) recursive (4 ), (b) reserve-oriented model, (c) two-pillar monetary policy
rule model, (d) Leeper et al. (1996).
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Figure 8: Impulse Responses, Euro Area, VECM (5.12)
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Notes: Identification schemes: (a) recursive (4 ), (b) reserve-oriented model, (c) two-pillar monetary policy
rule model, (d) Leeper et al. (1996).
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Figure 9: Impulse Responses, Euro Area, VAR Model (5.12)
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Notes: Identification schemes: (a) recursive (4 ), (b) reserve-oriented model, (c) two-pillar monetary policy
rule model, (d) Leeper et al. (1996).
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